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This paper was written by H.A. Hellyer, who at the time of writing was Fellow at the Centre for
Research in Ethnic Relations at the University of Warwick (UK), as a contemplation on some of the
issues raised on jihad at the ‘Religion and International Law’ Symposium at Santa Clara University
in February 2011. Gratitude and thanks are due to the organisers of that symposium, particularly
considering that the author was unable to confirm until extremely late whether he would be able to
attend, as he was then in Cairo.
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The Prophet came back from one of his campaigns saying: “You have come forth in the
best way of coming forth: you have come from the smaller jihad to the greater jihad.”
They said: “And what is the greater jihad?”
He replied: “The striving of God’s servants against their idle desires.”
– Prophetic adage
“The theology of jihad, which denies unbelievers equality of human rights and dignity, is
available today for anyone with the will and means to bring it to life.”
– Radical conservative websites
Jihad is one of those buzz words in international affairs that we all know of now — it is
finding its way into many non-Muslim world languages, usually with fairly negative
connotations. There are some key aspects that we must ponder in relation to its usage, its
received meaning, and what Muslims themselves (as the potential mujahids) understand it to
be, before considering its role within the international arena.
From the outset, it must be clear that when jihad is used in contemporary discourses in
the English language, (and here we are not distinguishing between Muslims and nonMuslims) it is most often used in conjunction with a political issue of some sort or another. It
is used, for example, in reference to a political group that has the word within its name, such
as the ‘Islamic Jihad’ group of Egypt, members of which assassinated the previous President
of Egypt, Anwar Sadat. Jihad is a theme that is often associated with political Islamism,1
which may or may not lead to a political program designed to bring about an ‘Islamic State,’2
whether within predominantly Muslim countries, or where Muslims exist as demographic
minorities. In this narrative, jihad is an aspect of a radical religious ideology that supports
terrorism and other acts of criminal violence, and there are sufficient numbers of right-wing
commentators, such as Melanie Philips in the UK, and Daniel Pipes and Robert Spencer in
the US, that promote this conception whether in international relations or domestic politics.3
The latter have proven to be remarkably more dangerous within the perception of certain
conservative circles and have led to actual policy effects — witness the current Congressional
hearings in the United States, where Congressman King held hearings in his capacity as
chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee on the radicalisation of American
Muslims. Some even accused the liberal, Sufism-leaning religious personality, Feisal Abdul
Rauf, of trying to establish a “jihadist headquarters” at the multi-faith community centre he
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3.
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It is important to note the differences between Islam, a religion, and Islamism, a political doctrine,
without necessarily descending into demonization or utopianism.
Something of an interesting historical quandary, considering that the nature of governing structures
within classical Islamic thought, prior to the colonial and imperial eras of the West, was very
different from the idea of the ‘state’ that developed from Western political theory. This fact has
brought home the reality that much of political Islamism owes its genesis to an interesting synthesis
between Islamic vocabulary and Western grammar.
See, e.g., ROBERT SPENCER, ISLAM UNVEILED: DISTURBING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WORLD’S FASTESTGROWING FAITH 145 (2002); Daniel Pipes, Jihad and the Professors, 114 COMMENTARY, no. 4, 2002
at 19, available at http://www.danielpipes.org/498/jihad-and-the-professors.
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intended to establish 600 feet from Ground Zero in New York City.4 It is clear that in these
different narratives, jihad has a markedly negative connotation.
Less common in modern English discourse, but by no means rare, is the use of jihad as a
spiritual and moral undertaking. Gibril Haddad, a contemporary Lebanese Muslim scholar,
uses a number of different Prophetic reports to justify his view of jihad in this fashion,5 and
many Muslim authorities tend to advocate the use of the word in this way, without excluding
other possible readings.
The veracity of all of these readings notwithstanding, it is interesting to see the wide
variety of perceptions with regards to what the word actually means — there are few words
that have entered into the English language that have such contested meanings. Some
linguists have sought to remind us that the relationship between the signifier and the
signified is entirely arbitrary — that a word means something just because enough people
agree that it does. That kind of assumption, however, depends on a certain type of worldview,
as well as a series of other assumptions. If a room of 5 people agree that a ‘car’ must refer to
an alien spacecraft, that is true as far as they are concerned, but once they look outside, they
might see differently. Moreover, they cannot possibly account for all the people that came
before them.
It is clear from a historical perspective that the first to use jihad as a term were the
Muslims of the Arabian peninsula and that the overwhelming majority of people who used,
and continue to use, the word, since then until the modern age, have been Muslims. That
contemporary communication tools, such as the international media, argue differently, says
less about the majority of the world’s population (let alone the majority of the world’s Muslim
population), and rather a lot more about the problematic nature of media.
The philosophical worldview6 of Muslims has been aptly described elsewhere, and we need
not go into more detail here. Suffice it to say that within that worldview, it is necessary to
distinguish between different types of jihad, all of which might find particular resonance
within the Islamic tradition, as well as identify those specific types of jihad that have
particular meanings and legal status.
Within that classically inspired worldview, jihad has a number of non-specific meanings
which arise from its general linguistic meaning. When we note non-specific meanings, we
mean that the Islamic tradition has not come to a specific set of rules, regulations or
procedures that apply to the implementation of these meanings. Jihad literally means
‘struggle’, and as such, many use the word jihad to refer to a variety of ‘struggles’: jihad for
health, jihad for the economy, jihad for welfare and so forth. Those meanings might have no
specific sanction from the Islamic tradition, in that the Prophet or God did not refer to jihad
in precisely those ways, but those meanings might have general sanction from the tradition,
in that the literal, lexical meaning of the word can be used justifiably in those circumstances.

4.
5.
6.

Monument to Jihad: Ground Zero Mosque No Joke, TORONTO SUN, July 27, 2010, available at
http://www.torontosun.com/comment/2010/07/26/14835681.html.
Sh. G. F. Haddad, Documentation of “Greater Jihad” Hadith, LIVING ISLAM (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://www.livingislam.org/n/dgjh_e.html.
SYED MUHAMMAD NAQUIB AL-ATTAS, ISLAM AND SECULARISM (2d ed. 1993); SYED MUHAMMAD
NAQUIB AL-ATTAS, PROLEGOMENA TO THE METAPHYSICS OF ISLAM (1995).
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There are other non-specific meanings that have sanction in the Islamic tradition, while
still not quite having particular rules or procedures attached to them. For example, the
Prophet is reported to have noted that speaking truth to an unjust ruler is jihad or that
giving birth is jihad, in addition to other activities. In so much as the Prophet described these
activities in these ways, they are legitimately called jihad with particular religious sanction,
but the jurists (fuqaha) of the religion have not established that certain characteristics must
be present in order to legitimately call such an activity ‘jihad’. In this regard, jihad is a nonspecific meaning, or at least a general meaning word.
There are two instances where jihad has a very particular and specific meaning. One is in
the pursuit of a particular type of martial, violent activity, and the other is in the spiritual
realm. In both of these instances, while their meanings find their root and core within the
Qur’an (the word of God in Islam) and the Prophetic tradition (the second highest source of
principles within the Islamic tradition), those meanings are mediated for the broad masses of
Muslims through the discourses and understandings of scholastic authorities (the ‘ulama).
In terms of where jihad is violent (i.e., the martial jihad), it is the fuqaha (jurists) among
the ‘ulama, that lay down the rules of jihad, according to their understanding of the Qur’an
and the Prophetic tradition (the sunnah), as well as latter precedents and sources. These
precedents and sources may differ somewhat, depending on the different rite of law
(madhhab) that the jurist follows, but there is no jurist that seeks to extract solely from the
Qur’an and the sunnah. This is akin to an American lawyer trying to argue a case in court
purely on the basis of the Constitution, without any reference to previous cases, precedent
and so forth — such an approach is simply not taken seriously in any developed legal system.
This reliance on authority does not differ between the Sunni and the Shi’i, although they
actualize it in different ways.
In terms of the spiritual jihad, experts or authorities in spirituality lay down the rules —
again, referring not simply to the Qur’an and the sunnah, but mediating those sources
through latter authorities. This keeps the tradition of spiritual jihad within the overall
domain of orthodox Sufism, which is in itself an indispensable part of pre-modern Islam, and
remains mainstream in the contemporary world7.
This reliance on authority and precedent is incredibly important to realise when
investigating the issues around Islamic law in general, and jihad in particular.
Commentators and discussants on this concept, regardless of their actual standpoint on jihad,
will often ignore it in the modern age, as they have not been trained within any proper
Islamic legal curriculum. This applies to the al-Qa’eda radicals, who are not products of any
seminary, but whose religious training is conspicuously absent,8 as well as to those far rightwing commentators who agree with al-Qa’eda functionaries that jihad is an expansionist
political philosophy. Many of the discussions that we now see in the English language result

7.
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The Amman Message, a document signed by many of the most noted Muslim religious authorities of
the contemporary era, was based on this very point. See THE AMMAN MESSAGE,
http://www.ammanmessage.com (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
See Abdal-Hakim Murad, Bin Laden’s Violence is a Heresy Against Islam, ISLAM FOR TODAY,
http://www.islamfortoday.com/murad04.htm (last visited March 10, 2012).

Jihad Re-examined — or Jihad Repaired?

from commentators plucking out Qur’anic verses or statements from the Prophet in
translation, or bereft of their full context, and arguing that jihad is this or that.
Islamic law is Islamic law, which is a highly developed legal system, whether we choose to
agree with all its formulations or not. From a public policy point of view, we benefit greatly
from that sophistication,9 for if Islamic scholarship did not work like that, and Islamic law
was akin to a do-it-yourself kit or blog, there would be a great deal more chaos within the
discussions of Islamic law. As it stands, the Sunni community of Muslims (and the Shi’is are
not far off on this point) stands united around four orthodox schools of law, with each of these
schools having clear and specific procedures with regards to the production of positive legal
prescriptions (ahkam).10 Those procedures have been developed and refined over more than a
thousand years of continuous legal discussion. The existence of four schools of law, and the
significant differences within and between each school, allows for a good deal of diversity and
pluralism within a unified set of frameworks. The absence of those four schools, however,
would likely result in the proliferation of Muslim legal amateurism, without the checks and
balances that result from a thousand years of development.
This amateurism is already in operation, but frequently overlooked.11 The terrorist antics
of al-Qa’eda-type movements rely not on the classical formulations of Islamic law, the
authorities of which continue to reject wanton violence, but on systematically putting aside
the systems of precedent that have governed Islamic law for so long. Much of al-Qa’eda
communiqués attack traditionally educated religious authorities for precisely this reason,
although their missives generally conflate the existence of religious functionaries who
essentially buttress dictatorial regimes, with scholastic authorities who choose to tolerate the
existence of those regimes without resorting to political violence.12 Removing the strictures of
scholastic authority is a double-edged sword indeed — it might allow for liberalism to be more
easily cast into an Islamic paradigm (or vice versa), but it also allows for radical extremism
the same flexibility.
Thus, for example, when commentators insist that the Prophet lauded martial combat
against ‘hypocrites’ (munafiqoon) or ‘non-believers’ (kuffar), it is important to recognise that
these statements have been subjected to a great deal of commentary, explanation and
exposition over the centuries by scholastic authorities. Their task was, and remains as such,

9.
10.
11.
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See H.A. HELLYER, ENGAGEMENT WITH THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 14-18
(Brookings ed., 2007), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/12_counterterrorism_hellyer.aspx.
See generally ABDAL HAKIM MURAD, UNDERSTANDING THE FOUR MADHHABS: FACTS ABOUT IJTIHAD
AND TAQLID (Muslim Academic Trust, 1999).
H.A. Hellyer, Wanton Violence in Muslimdom, in THE STATE WE ARE IN: IDENTITY, TERROR AND THE
LAW OF JIHAD 93 (Aftab Ahmad Malik ed., 2008).
In the wake of the Arab uprisings of 2011, a number of debates broke out among scholastic
authorities. Many of them argued that the idea of protest was entirely in keeping with the Islamic
tradition, and thus religious authorities should support the idea of protesting in all countries where
injustice was taking place. Many others, on the other hand, argued that more important than
protest was public order, and that protest could easily lead to an incredibly unstable situation. The
discussions still continue. See M. Afifi al–Akiti & H. A. Hellyer, The Negotiation of Modernity
through Tradition in Contemporary Muslim Intellectual Discourse, in KNOWLEDGE, LANGUAGE,
THOUGHT AND THE CIVILIZATION OF ISLAM (Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud & Muhammad Zainiy
Uthman ed., 2010).
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to subject such reports to critical analysis based on other Prophetic reports, the authenticity
of the reports, the precedents within the Qur’an, and the circumstances of the time. Any
academic or non-academic review of jihad, similarly, needs to be very careful about coming to
specific conclusions, without referring to the canon of these discussions among scholastic
authorities. Limiting oneself to the text itself (i.e., the Qur’anic revelation, or to universally
agreed upon Prophetic reports) is seldom the way to understand the breadth of the Islamic
tradition.
While some contemporary authorities may try to extrapolate such precedents for current
political goals, it is important that we place them into their right context. A recent case in
point: in the recent Egyptian uprising, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s most
famed scholar, and graduate of the Azhar University in Cairo, declared that to participate in
the protests was fard al-’ayn (personally obligatory) upon every capable Muslim in Egypt.13
That carries a certain weight in Islamic law. If an action is described as fard, then to carry it
out brings reward in the eyes of God, and to not carry it out brings out the liability of
punishment from God. It is no small thing to describe any action as fard, but when it is
applied to a political action, it becomes rather suspect. Political activity is the ‘art of the
possible’, and as such, is based on empirical judgments that are liable to be incredibly
arbitrary. It was not surprising, therefore, that other scholastic authorities have long
described al-Qardawi as a political activist first and foremost, who is also a jurist — one who
has loathed the Egyptian state since Gamal Abdal Nasser’s time — rather than a jurist first
and foremost, who happens to be a political activist. The difference is well noted, which is why
it seems to have been more common among scholastic authorities in Egypt who did support
the protests to argue that participation was fard al-kifayah (communally obligatory).14 The
difference between this and fard al-’ayn is quite important — if a group of Egyptians took up
the responsibility, then the rest of the population was exempt, with the corollary being that if
no one protested, then the entire population was at fault.
Of course, none of these figures has the ability to enforce his or her belief on the populace
at large. Islamic law has always had a healthy difference of opinion built into it, and the nonspecialized have always been free to adhere to whatever position they personally felt
comfortable with. This is not the case with regard to declaring a martial jihad. In pre-modern
times, the leader of the Muslim territory, whether in consultation with, or in conjunction
with, scholastic authorities or not, did have the right to enforce conscription into the national
defence force for participation in the jihad. Those excluded from forcibly enlisting in the jihad
would have to have religious reasons for doing so — such as non-Muslims. But otherwise, this
would be considered a religiously sanctioned, compulsory conscription, and there are many
instances in Muslim history where this was the case, just as there were many cases in non-

13.
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H.A. Hellyer, Muslim Brotherhood: Protect Churches, RELIGION DISPATCHES, Feb. 3, 2011,
http://www.religiondispatches.org/dispatches/hahellyer/4178/muslim_brotherhood%3A_protect_chur
ches%3B_mufti_exempts_egyptians_from_friday_prayer/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
S’ad ‘Atiyal al-Azhari, Is Protesting Permissible? SUHAIB WEBB.COM, Feb. 3, 2011,
http://www.suhaibwebb.com/islam-studies/faqs-and-fatwas/is-protesting-permissible/ (last vistited
Mar. 10, 2012).
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Muslim history where the governing power declared that all able men must defend the
territory of the homeland.
There is an interesting contemporary controversy in this regard, whereby many argue that
the jihad has both a defensive and an offensive mode. The defensive mode is a response to an
attack on the territory, i.e., the territory has been attacked, and the authorities decide to
repel the invasion or attack by a martial force. The offensive mode is different — no attack on
the territory has taken place, but the Muslim authorities decide to engage in a martial
intervention even in the absence of an attack. Muslim apologists frequently argue that the
‘offensive’ mode does not exist — that all “real” jihads are, by necessity, defensive in nature,
and that all “offensive” martial actions might take on the symbolism of jihad, but cannot
possibly be a jihad. It is an interesting claim, but it is not one that is backed up by Muslim
history, unless historians can prove that all religious authorities who authorised offensive
jihads were somehow wrong. At the same time, while it is clear many offensive martial
actions took place in Muslim history and were permitted, even lauded, by scholastic
authorities, it is also clear that the idea of expansionism and imperial gain from colonialism is
not something that is sought under Islamic law. On the contrary, Islamic law has very clear
rules and regulations with regard to the exploitation of territories and communities that come
under Islamic law. This leaves us in something of a quandary — how can these seemingly
contradictory imperatives be reconciled, as surely they must have been?
There are two additional facts to keep in mind with regard to the use of force in
international affairs — something recognised by the international community even today.
Bellum iustum allows, and even encourages, the use of force when there are overriding
ethical interests involved, such as the protection of civilians from a tyrannical ruler. Islamic
law, likewise, allows for the use of force in situations other than defense of one’s own
territory.
More importantly, however, to understand about classical Islamic law on this point is to
remember the world of pre-modernity, as compared to the modern world. In today’s world,
international law is a considerable force. The norm that all nations seek, as per the United
Nations charter, is peace between nations rather than conflict. We seek perpetual peace, and
we avoid war and conflict unless absolutely necessary. We try to accomplish this by setting up
an international order which is based on mutually agreed-upon treaties and laws, and we
have tried, as an international community, to bring all nations on this planet into that order.
Yet, this is a very recent phenomenon in human history. The idea of such an order in
international affairs was an idealistic dream for the world until fairly recently — no more
than a couple hundred years. The international order that existed hitherto was not based on
the existence of order or institutions, but on the lack of order, and perpetual absence of those
institutions and instruments designed to keep things at peace. It has only been a very short
while since the human family opted to appeal to agreed-upon laws as a way to guarantee
international peace. Otherwise, war was the norm, not the exception, if one had the ability to
wage it. This was, simply, a natural corollary to the absence of international order. If you
deemed that, within your territory, you had a degree of order based on the rule of law, then
naturally, you would prefer that your neighbors be brought into your system of order rather
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than remain as a disorderly territory on your borders that would attack you at any instant,
bringing the people of your territory under a disorderly system.
This was the case, and remembering this is vital in understanding how pre-modern
Muslim scholastic authorities tended to view international relations and the use of force. For
if this is such a situation where, essentially, it is the survival of the fittest, it is not surprising
that Islamic law had little trouble in pre-empting attacks. Moreover, many scholastic
authorities lauded such pre-emptive attacks. In our own age, where one can appeal to
international law and international legal institutions, such as the UN, the International
Criminal Court, and so forth, pre-emptive defensive attacks are extremely rare and
problematic. A pre-emptive defensive attack is essentially a declaration that the international
order has broken down, even if only on one side of the conflict. This is an incredibly difficult
thing to prove in today’s world, particularly where it is not simply the international legal
order that ties a nation-state to the rest of the international community, but also its
internationally-linked economic interests, which stand to suffer a great deal if that state is
identified as a “pariah state”. When one could not appeal to such structures and knew that
the only things that stood against invasion of one’s own territory were either the threat of
violence or the incapacity of the enemy, pre-emption (or at least the threat of pre-emption)
could easily become the norm.
Secondly, it is entirely unsurprising that on a quasi-humanitarian basis, some Muslim
scholastic authorities viewed the world around them as inferior in terms of the rule of law.
The rule of law in most neighboring parts of the Muslim domain was often non-existent — we
should recall the time and era historically. It is thus equally unsurprising that they
considered that residents of those neighboring domains might welcome the rule of law, even if
it came from a foreign religion or power. Indeed, it is clear that, particularly in the early
period of Islamic history, newly conquered territories such as Egypt, North Africa and Spain
welcomed the Muslim armies from Arabia, which brought the promise of a better future than
the one they contemplated.15
Much of this changed with the dawn of the modern period, and as a result of the contact
with modernity, much of Islamic law became subject to a substantial paradigm shift, once
scholastic authorities became (and continue to become) appropriately familiar with the world
we now occupy. That process, ironically, has become much more difficult in the modern
period, even though it is a time which is arguably most essential for Muslim communities at
large. Pre-modern Muslim communities had little problem adjusting to the changing
circumstances from a religious point of view, because the seminaries and universities that
produced scholastic authorities were dynamic centres of education and produced from within
their graduates and faculty some of the keenest minds of Muslim civilisation. As such, they
found it relatively easy to provide Renaissance men like al-Ghazali, who were able to properly
situate and contextualise their knowledge for the benefit of the Muslim community at large.
Such men were well trained. The immense irony is that with modernity, the Muslim world is
hit with two difficulties. The first is colonialism and imperialism, which systematically
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disable and set in motion the degrading of centres of scholastic authority. The second is the
incredible set of paradigm shifts that occurred with the dawn of the modern world and which
philosophically is incredibly challenging to the pre-modern Islamic worldview. While this set
of shifts was arguably more astounding than any other change that occurred before it, the
Muslim scholastic community was far less prepared to respond to it — their centres of
learning were not as dynamic as they had once been.
Nevertheless, it did take place,16 and for that reason, this whole controversy around the
distinction between “offensive” and “defensive” jihad is something of an academic question.
Contemporary scholastic authorities do not dwell on this issue anymore. It does not occupy
their discourse precisely because they know the world has changed. Instead of calling for
offensive jihad, they call to the institutions of international order (the UN, and so forth),
which is an implicit acceptance of the world in which we now live.
Beyond the ideas of offensive and defensive jihad, there are other issues that remain quite
awkward with regard to the use of force in international relations as it pertains to jihad. An
oft-mentioned issue is the subject of suicide bombings, of which Yusuf al-Qaradawi has the
erstwhile reputation of being overwhelmingly in favour of when utilised against Israeli
targets in the Holy Land. Nevertheless, despite al-Qaradawi’s prolific and popular standing
in the Muslim world, this stance has been roundly rejected by many other scholastic
authorities in different countries for having contravened key and cardinal principles of
Islamic jurisprudence. War has its rules, and some of the rules of law in the Islamic tradition
relate to what kind of weapons can be used by a just warrior, as well as who can and who
cannot be targeted. In the case of suicide bombers, both of these issues are glossed over by
supporters of such operations, even while they are exceedingly clear within the corpus of
Islamic jurisprudence, indicating, perhaps, that even ‘men of God’ can be overcome by
emotion owing to a political issue. Within Islamic jurisprudence, no non-combatant (and there
are clear definitions for “non-combatants” in Islamic jurisprudence) may be specifically
targeted — unlike many suicide-bombing operations. Moreover, while there are religiously
sanctioned situations in which a warrior might go up against overwhelming odds (which
essentially makes it akin to a “suicide mission”), there are no religiously sanctioned situations
whereby a warrior voluntarily takes his or her own life, regardless of the aim. That is the very
definition of suicide, which is universally condemned in Islamic law, whether one does so out
of desperation, or one does so in order to focus an attack. There are no real exceptions to that
except under duress, which certainly does not apply in the case of suicide bombers.17
It is clear that the various issues around the use of the word jihad in international affairs
will not suddenly disappear overnight. There are serious concerns here, and they require a
deft set of responses in order to clarify and explicate what orthodox Islamic law does or does

16.
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Afifi al-Akiti & H.A. Hellyer, The Negotiation of Modernity through Tradition in Contemporary
Muslim Intellectual Discourse: The Neo-Ghazalian, Attasian Perspective, in KNOWLEDGE,
LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND THE CIVILIZATION OF ISLAM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SYED MUHAMMAD
NAQUIB AL-ATTAS (Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud & Muhammad Zainiy Uthman, eds., 2010).
An excellent treatment of this in the English language is found in M. Afifi al-Akiti, Defending the
Transgressed, in THE STATE WE ARE IN: IDENTITY, TERROR AND THE LAW OF JIHAD (Aftab Ahmad
Malik, ed., 2008).
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not say on such things — not as a set of apologetics, which does not seem to solve more
problems than it creates, but rather to inform and clarify, in the context of today’s world as
well as the pre-modern world, where many normative stipulations around jihad, as well as
other topics in Islamic law, were argued and discussed. There are not many authors that have
been able to manage this balance, and a balance of knowledge it is. It requires a deep
understanding of Islamic law, as understood by the scholastics of that system of
jurisprudence, and it requires a keen awareness of both history as well as contemporary
political and social dynamics. All too often, one or more of those several elements are absent,
and an imbalance takes place.
Nevertheless, there are individuals and institutions that are at work in that regard, and
the signs are promising. There is a continual exchange between seminary institutions in the
Muslim world and universities in the West, on an institutional level. There is a growing
number of young Muslim Westerners, who are entirely at home in understanding a Western
universe, who are exploring the world of the traditional seminary in Muslim majority
countries, and there are citizens from Muslim majority countries that are likewise fascinated
with how the world of Western academia works. Lest we forget, the roots of modernity are
indeed Western, and it will require awareness, if not an agreement, with those roots, if the
circles of Islamic law are to fully understand the world in which we live.
In terms of jihad, this is no longer necessary — it has already taken place, which is
perhaps reason for optimism.
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